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Introduc tion 
Unlike the European case, where feudal relations of production themselves gave birth 
to capitalist relations, in  Africa indigenous relations of production were tramformed 
also as a result of the intervention of outside forces. The end result was the 
subordination of the indigenous relations, although the form which th is  took differed 
widely i n  different parts of Africa. 
l 
The object of the present paper i s  t o  throw some l ight  on aspects of th is  
process as it occurred in Swaziland. In particular, the role of the British s ta te  
w i l l  be examined during the period 1903-1907, the former date marking the beginning 
of British rule in Swaziland. During th is  period the prime aim of the British state 
was to establish a se t  of property relations appropriate for capital ist  accumulation. 1 
However, in order to locate the present study, it i s  necessary f i r s t  to provide an 
introduction to the context i n  which the British s ta te  took over formal control i n  
Swmiland. l 
By the middle of the nineteenth century the ttSwazi Nationtt had been formed 
as a result of the successful military and poli t ical  subordination of a number of 
Sotho and Nguni  groups by the conquering (~guni) Dlamini. clan. (1) The result was a 
hierarchical class-based society i n  which the division between dominant and dominated 
class revolved around the effective control of land by the former and the papnent of 
tribute-labour by the l a t t e r ,  principally i n  the form of l a b o ~ t i m e  spent working for 
the King, princes and chiefs. However, secondary divisions existed also among the 
dominant and dominated classes. While a chief was able to ca l l  for  tribute labour 
(memo), all chiefs were required to perform tribute labour for the King when he 
demanded it. In addition, some chiefs were more powerful and influential than others. 
Similarly, there were rich and poor tfcommoners" i n  tenas of control over land and 
cattle. Although a l l  were entitled to "begft for labour - indicating that they 
did not have an automatic right to receive labour), the rich, with more resources 
available for the provision of the compensatory food, were able to receive a net 
surplus of labour time. (2) 
The Swazi ruling class, supported by an effective military apparatus (which 
was used on occasion against the neighbouring Sekukuni and ~ u l u ) ,  was able to 
consolidate i t s  control over an area defined de facto by the balance of power between 
themselves and the Transvaal Boers to the north and west, the Zulu to the south, and 
the Portuguese to the east. Within th is  area they controlled resources that were to 
become more valuable over time. Until 1880 these consisted mainly of winter grazing 
lands and, from about 1860, for various reasons, the Swazi rulers panted temporary 
grazing rights to a number of Transvaal Boers. In the early 1880s the situation 
changed dramatically, with the discovery of gold in the north-western part of 
Swaziland. This led to an immediate inflow of additional concession-seekers, who, 
given the effective control of the Swazi rulers in this part of the country and the 
unwillingness of the South African Republic or Britain to challenge that control, were 
forced to negotiate with the S W i  rulers. A number of (sometimes contradictory) 
reasons have been put forward to explain why the Swazi ru l i ng  class was prepared to 
extend rights, however minimal (3 ) ,  over the resources under their control. One line 
of reasoning focusses on the prevailing structural imbalances in power and on the 
consequent desire of the S w i  rulers to av~id political and military destruction by 
voluntarily granting access to resources while attempting, as far as possible, to 
retain overall control. A variant of this line emphasiaes the attempts of the Swazi 
rulers to plw the South African Republic, Britain and the Zulu off against one 
another, Another line of thought, which, while differing in emphasis, does not 
necessarily contradict the first, is that the Swazi rulers wished to extend their 
control over resources by selling the temporary rights to resources in return for money, 
which gave them claims to commodities produced in other modes of production. 
It is, after all, hardly insignificant that by 1887 King Mbandzeni was receiving about 
£15,000 in gold per annum as rent from concessions. Whatever the combination of 
reasons for the granting of rights to resources by the Swazi rulers, it remains that 
a large number of often confusing and contradictory riets were granted. These 
included the notorious concession to collect rents on all other concessions and the 
concession to grant concessions. 
The granting of concessions, however, resulted in the steady subordination of 
the Swazi rulers, in the first instance, to the concessionaires themselves and, throw 
them, to .the states of the South African Republic and Britain. In the nineteenth 
century the concessionaires themselves were divided into three, often antagonistic 
groups. Firstly, there were those whose activities formed a part of capitalist 
accumulation; these included mining, mercantile and agricultural operations on the 
basis of wage-labour. (4) Secondly, there were feudal elements involved in grazing 
and, to a lesser extent, farming in Swaziland. Lastly, there were those involved 
neither in production nor in trading activities, including speculators who bought and 
sold concession rights and those who rented their rights. To some extent the interests 
of the first and second groups of concessionaires were represented by the British and 
South African Republican states, respectively. However, the ultimate intervention of 
these states in Swaziland was determined by a wider range of considerations than merely 
the interests of the concessionaires. (5) Be that as it may, it was clear that in the 
decade from 1884 (the signing of the 3;ondon convention) to 1894 (the signing of the 
Third Swaziland Convention, which turned Swaziland into a protectorate of the South 
African ~e~ublic) the British state was prepared to accept increasing formal control 
by the South African Republic in Swaziland. This situation lasted until the outbreak 
of the Anglo-Boer War in 1899. 
This brief characterization of "the subordination of the Swazi rulersn is, 
however, apt to be misleading, as are most accounts of the "disintegration" of the 
Swazi rulers and their "paper conquestf1. The reason is that the subordination was a 
contradictory process: while the power of the Swazi rulers was certainly. subordinated 
to forces that were originally external, their position of dominance within their own 
mode of production was scrupulously maintained. Thus, although the Swazi rulers were 
"conqueredw and their control over land substantially reduced, their position as a 
ruling class was reproduced. This was as true of the concessionaires as of Britain 
and the South African Republic. As Allister Miller, who succeeded Theophilus 
Shepstone in 1889 for a brief period as adviser to King Mbandzeni, put it: "the King 
was always sure of his authority inasmuch as it was conserved to him by every Eumpean 
who came to the country in an authoritative position. No-one wished to see Umbanine 
[Mbandzeni] lose his power because they knew his authority was of a friendly character 
to Europeans." (6) Similar provisions were made in the Third Swaziland Convention, 
althow the possibility of curtailing the ttinternal power'! of the Swazi rulers was not 
precluded: "the management of the internal affairs of the Natives shall be in 
accordance with their own laws and customs .. . [which] shall be administered by the 
Native Chiefs entitled to administer the same in such manner as they are in accordance 
with the Native law and custom at present administering, in so far as the said laws and 
customs are not inconsistent with civilized laws and customs. In the event, the 
relative power of the Swazi rulers was to be maintained until the present d q  
(altho* it must be added that this is due to a number of complex factors, many of 
which aze not discussed here). 
In the following section, the measures taken by the British Government 
(which took over formal control of Swaziland after the Anglo-Boer war) to lqsolveN the 
question of land rights are examined. 
The Capitalist (colonial) State and Land Partition, 1903-1907 
After the Anglo-Boer War Britain, having conquered the South African 
Republic, took formal control of Swaziland by issuing the Swaziland Order-in-Council 
of June 25 1903. According to the Order-in-Council, the Governor of the Transvaal was 
empowered to legislate by Proclamation and to administer Swaziland throu& a Resident 
Commissioner. (7) Regarding "native adrministrationl', the Governor was to llrespect any 
Native laws by which the Civil relations of any Native Chiefs, tribes or populations 
are now regulated, except in so far as may be incompatible with the due exercise of 
His Majesty's power and jurisdiction or is clearly injurious to the welfare of the 
said Natives". 
One of the first tasks of the new administration was to resolve the question 
of land ownership. In 1904, Proclamation No. 3 was issued, which stated the intention 
of the Governor to establish a Concessions Commission to delimit land solely for Swazi 
occupation. Clearly the state had to intervene, since accumulation was hampered by the 
lack of clarity regarding legal rights of ownership. As Allister Miller pointed out, 
up to the time of the 1904 Proclamation 
... a native had the right of grazing his cattle with the 
herds of the European, the European used the same g'rasing 
pound as the native. The farmer might run his furrow up 
to the gate of a native kraal or round a native garden, 
and the native might cultivate a new plot on any untilled 
land. The native had free passage over the white man's 
farm, the European fenced and built where and how he 
pleased. (8) 
Regarding the question of land ownership, the interests of the concessionaires 
and the Swasi (both the Swazi rulers and their subjects) were diametrically opposed. 
The Swazi argued that Mbandzeni merely gave the temporary use of the land to the 
concessionaires, while the latter argued that they had purchased the land. In this 
conflict the state, as in all class societies, was not neutral but intervened 
decisively in the interests of the dominant class - the mining, mercantile and 
agricultural concessionaires. From the very beginning it was taken for granted by the 
state that the Swazi would be given as much land as they needed in order to reproduce 
themselves, and the only real point at issue between the concessionaires and the state 
was how much was ltnecessarylt. (9) The "moral" or "legal1' rights that the Swazi might . 
have to the land were never an issue, and the views of even the British Special 
Commissioner to Swaziland, Ehraght-Moony, despite their supportable logic, and despite 
the fact that he was Itin agreement" with "the principle being followed" by the 
Commission, were ignored. (10) The Special Commissioner doubted whether l1the quantity 
[of land], having regard to the peculiar circumstances of the situation, is equal to 
what the Swazis can justly claim". He continued: 
The whole question of the division of the land in this 
territory is one of considerable difficulty as there 
are several important factors in its settlement peculiar 
to the situation which must be considered but which the 
Concessionaires now ignore ... The chief of these is the 
right of the Natires to occupy and use the land 
unrestrictedly, a right which has not hitherto been 
disputed, which has, in many instances, been specifically 
reserved in the Concession deeds, and which it was 
clearly the intention of Umbandine [Mbandzeni] to 
strictly preserve in.all cases ... The position was 
I think recognized by the whites and the claim of 
ownershi2 by many of them is of comparatively late 
growth* 
Ehraght-Moony therefore concluded that 
The question of land to be reserved seems also to be 
one that in common justice should be decided upon the 
nature of the rights belonging, and already secured, 
to the Native, rather than by an arbitrary standard 
based upon the absolute minimum required to support a 
family at the present moment. 
His suggestion was that "it would be no injustice to accord a certain 
percentage of the area claimed - sa;y one third to two fifths - to each European 
Concessionaire, free of Native reservations, with freehold titleft. (11) However, 
even if the "rightsff of the S m i  were irrelevant, their continuing power was a fact 
the state could not ignore. 1Us was disclosed in a S- written by Allister 
faller of a discussion he had with the High Commissioner in 1906: 
Your Excellency had been told on the best authority 
you had consulted that the recent trouble in Natal 
lthe Zulu Bambata ~ebellion] was caused through the 
delimitation of land in Zululand and you would not 
imperil the peace of this country by rashly importing 
here a similar excuse for discontent. You would advise 
the Secretary of State on these grounds that we should 
have to exercise extreme care in the matter of 
partition. I replied that we considered that ... not 
one-third but one-fourth was more than sufficient for 
Swazi occupation] . . . (12) 
For their part, the Ehzi rulers made their position entirely clear in a 
petition by Xabotsibeni, the Queen Regent of the Swazi Nation, and her most important 
councillors and chiefs, sent to the High Commissioner and dated 30th December 1904 (13). 
Regarding Section 20 (1) of the 1904 Proclamation, the petition stated: 
It practically means that the Swazi Nation will, under 
the Governor of the Transvaal, be placed in locations to 
be decided by a Commission. This is in absolute conflict 
with the terns of Article 2 (3) of the Convention of 1894 . . . 
Why,= ask, shall the] Concessionaires have a pre-emptive 
right over other subjects of His Majesty! The limitation 
of boundaries or locations is an abhorrence to the Swazi 
Nation, and to alienate their land, as is proposed ... will 
be to treat them as a conquered people which, of course, 
they are not. They, of their own free will, applied for 
and have received the protection of the ... British Nation 
whose allies they were in the Sekukuni War, and indeed at 
all times. (14) 
Regarding an alternative solution to the concessions problem, the Swazi rulers made 
the reasonable, and surprisingly moderate, suggestion that the concessions 
should be absolutely cancelled and annulled in all cases 
where the Concessions depended on a yearly or other rental 
and which rental has not been paid; such Concessions 
should revert to the Swazi Nation as originally intended. (15) 
The Swazi rulers were prepared to give further significant concessions to the 
concessionaires: "Of course, in cases where a specified sum has been given as a 
consideration for Concessions, we recognise that such Concessions cannot be interfered 
with." (16) Entirely reasonable suggestions were also made in connection with the 
Private Revenue Concession: the concession that entitled the holder to collect a d  
retain the rents paid on concessions: 
... if it be decided that such Concessions as those 
coming under the Head of Harrington1s Concession [ the 
Private Revenue Concession], afterwards ceded to the 
South African Republic, are valid, then the Swazi 
Nation is entitled to receive from the Transvaal 
Government the sum of £63,000, more or less, because 
since the month of September 1899 no revenue from 
Harringtonls Concession has been paid to or received 
by the Swazi Nation; and, as the Swazis had no 
concern after the date of Harringtonls Concession 
with the collection of revenue from individual 
Concessionaires, there is either the aforesaid sum 
of i?.63,000 now due to them, or if such rents have not 
been paid in accordance with the terms of such 
Concessions, it is submitted that a11 rights under 
such Concessions should be forfeited owing to the non- 
payment of such rent. What is wanted is Swaziland 
for the Swazis and their independence recognised in 
terms of the several Conventions beforementioned ... 
The Swazi Nation has all dag objected to the granting 
of Concessions indiscriminately by the late King 
Urnbandine [~bandzeni] as an infringement of its rights 
and they now claim that such as can should be abolished. (17) 
What more reasonable argument, according to the noms of capitalist society, 
could have been put forward: that property rights, extended in return for the pa~rment 
of a rent, should revert to the original owner in the event of the non-payment of such 
rent? The Swazi rulers were even prepared to accept the validity of those concessions 
for which rent was paid, even though they consistently rejected the claim that Mbandzeni 
had intended to give such strong rights over Swazi land; they argued the King was free 
to reclaim the land when he wanted to. However, property rights, the basis of the 
capitalist state, were, it appeared, to be guaranteed not to those who, by all accounts, 
were lawfully entitled to them but to those who had unlawfully usurped them. The 
capitalist state, the guarantor of property ri&ts, was to be the agent for the 
removal of the property rights of the Swazi. 
Milner refused to reply publicly to the Swazi petition but made his views 
clear one month later in a private letter to the Resident Magistrate in Swaziland. 
With a blend of racism and paternalism he blamed the cunning Queen Regent, Iiabotsibeni, 
who was grudgingly respected by the colonial officials who had to deal with her , and 
some unknown white legal adviser who naturally must have perverted the Swazi mind. (18) 
Regarding the concessions, Milner, with the aid of superb colonial double-think, argued: 
It is not our fault that Umbandine gave these concessions ... 
It is not true to sap that we are taking away the Natives! 
land and putting them in locations. The Concessionaires 
have certain rights over the land, sometimes very strong 
rights, and if they began effectively to exercise them it 
might end in the Swazis finding that the land had become 
worthless to themselves. Nobody can quite sqy where the 
right of the concessionaire ends and that of the Swazi 
begins or vice versa. As long as they have both got 
indefinite ri&ts on the same land, disputes are certain. 
It is to prevent such disputes, and to ensure to the 
Swazis absolute and undisputed ownership of an ample 
amount of land, that the [concessions] Commission has been 
empowered,where it sees fit, to make a partition of the 
land comprised in any concession, giving part of it 
absolutely to the concessionaire and part of it absolutely 
to the Swazis. The idea, that the Swazis are to be herded 
together into two or three locations, and all the rest 
of the country handed over to the Europeans, is 
groundless. (19) 
As groundless as Milner claimed this was, in the event the Swazi were to 
receive one-third of the area of Swaziland, scattered into some thirty-five locations. 
However, Milner was more frank in connection with the Private Revenue Concession. The 
British administration intended receiving concessions revenues in order to finance its 
activities in the country, and, while it claimed +hat such activities would benefit 
the interests of the Swazi, a claim which no one with any knowledge of the details of 
the administration's expenditure could take very seriously, it was forced to be more 
honest in this case: 
As regards the Revenue Concession, this is, no doubt, 
a point of the greatest difficulty, a.nd the area in 
which we ourselves are on the least sure ground. I 
think the best course to take is to be quite frank 
about it, and to tell the h z i s  that we are not going 
to recognize %his concession any more, but that we a m ,  
independently of it, going to collect the Revenues to 
which it refers,and to apply them to carqying on the 
Government of Swaziland. It is impossible to maintain 
that these Revenues were the private property of the 
ruler of Swaziland as an individual. They embmcedl all 
the then existing sources of public income, and whatever 
governmental expenditure there w s  could only have been 
defrayed out of them. We aroe now defra3r:tt-g all this 
expenditure. At the same time we recognise that the Queen, 
or whoever may, from time to time, be the heaa of the 
Swazis, is entitled to a certain share of these Revenues 
as private income, just as our King receives, as of right, 
a certain sham of the Revenues of the State for his 
private uses. In this manner we are prepared to pay the 
Queen £1,500 a year out of the public coffers from this 
date, without claiming repapent of anything previously 
advanced to her. It should be clearly explained that the 
whole balance of the Revenue comprised in the concession 
now coming to an end, as well as the Native Tax, are not 
being taken away, but spent in Swaziland itself for the 
benefit of that country. (20) 
In the event, the Private Revenue Concession was cancelled in 1905 and, 
according to Proclamation g of 1906, its accumulated receipts of some £20,000 were 
, used to form the Private Revenue Tmnst. The interest from this T m t  - at 4% 
l yielding £800 per mum - were paid to the Chief R.egent. (21) 
In addition to Section 20 (1) of the 1904 Proclamation, there was a further 
provision in Clause 6 which,the Swazi felt, dealt a severe blow to the hierarchy of 
I political control within Swazi society. This clause stated that 
Anything to the contrary notwithstanding in the foregoing 
provisions, the Paramount Chief [i.e. the ~ing] and other 
Native Chiefs shall continue to exercise jurisdiction 
according to Native laws and customs in all civil disputes 
in which aboriginal Natives only are concerned; provided 
alwa~rs that it shall be competent for any party to such 
civil dispute to appeal from the decision of any such Chief 
as aforesaid to the Resident Magistrate, whose decision on 
such Appeal shall be final. (22) 
The Swazi rulers strongly opposed this clause, arguing that it would undermine their 
authority, and argued that therefore, while criminal matters should be handled by the 
British state, all civil matters should remain under the control of the Swazi rulers 
(the petition was signed only by people of the status of chief and above): 
We feel very strongly that this is a blow at the power 
and authority of our Chiefs and Paramount Chief 
inasmuch as it will rob them of the authority at present 
held by them over the people and will tend to make the 
people disrespect those who have hitherto been in 
authority over them and to whose authority they have 
hitherto bowed with every deference ... In this 
connection our Nation desires that all civil suits be 
tried by the Chiefs of the several districts with the 
right of appeal to the Swazi King or Paramount Chief. (23) 
However, regarding criminal cases, the Swazi rulers stated: 
We admit that we ourselves asked for the protection of 
the British Government, and as crimes are committed 
against the state or country rather than against the 
person, we recognise that the punishment for such crimes 
should be in the hands of our Protectors. That being so, 
we agree that such crimes as those scheduled in the 
Protocol of 1898 aforesaid 6241 shall be cognisable only 
by the courts of the British Crown having jurisdiction. (25) 
This was, indeed, a significant concession. An earlier attempt to deprive King Bunu 
of jurisdiction over criminal matters had practically led to a war between the Swazi 
and the Boers. 
Milner, however, lightly rejected the Swazi rulers' claim that their authority 
would be undermined: 
It is absurd to say that the appeal to the Magistrate 
destroys the respect for the Chief; if the Chief 
gives good decisions, the Magistrate will uphold him 
and thus confirm his authority. (26) 
Such lack of logic was not surprising since the British state was determined to impose 
its authority,and thus Milner was unable to consider the case where, in the eyes of 
the Magistrate, the Chief gave a "bad" decision, and the effects on the Swazi people 
of their Chief being overruled. Milner was more honest when he went on: "Anyway, we 
cannot, as protectors of the Swazi people, abdicate our rights to prevent gross 
injustice in civil cases ." (27) 
The concessionaires, on the other hand, fully in support of the principles 
of pwtition, were concerned to ensure that the state would accept their definition of 
the "ample amount of landf1 that Milner said would be given to the Swazi, While a 
majority of the concessionaires were originally prepared to give up half of their land, 
if necessary, they were persuaded by the vigorous efforts of Allister Miller to secure 
a better deal. (28) The main organization through which the interests of the 
concessionaires were represented was the Swaziland Mining, Commercial and Industrial 
Chamber. (This chamber also represented the interests of the farming concessionaires 
and many of the mining concessionaires had substantial agricultural interests .) In a 
letter from the Ekecutive Council of the Chamber to the High Commissioner~s Office, 
dated 29th September 1906, the Council argued that ffAny settlement shall have as its 
base an arbitrary and uniform reservation of a proportionate area of each land grant 
for native occupation, which area shall not exceed one-fourth of each 6,000 acres of 
land .If However, special provision had to be made for the S w ' i  rulers, On the 
one hand, it was desirable to attempt to gain their support for the land partition, at 
least in so f& as this did not require the making of too generous concessions, while, 
on the other hand, it was necessary to maintain the control of the Swazi rulers over 
the rest of the population and in this way to control the latter. Accordingly, the 
Swazi rulers had to be given special treatment. The Council therefore recommended 
"the acquisition by expropriation of 20 farms of 6,000 acres each for the proper 
provfsioning of the paramount chief and other important sub-chiefs in the 
territoryff. (30) 
Mineral concession holders were, however, in a special position because, as 
David Forbes, the General Manager of the Swazi Coal Mines, pointed out: 
If on the portions of land beaconed off as Native amas 
all mineral rights are to be taken from the mineral 
Concessionaire, it will in q cases involve great loss 
not only to the mine owner, but also to the country lsic!] 
. . . on base metal areas such as the Swazi Coal Mines 
property no-one can say where the exact spots are or where 
the best beds of coal will be found. (31) 
Forbes therefore recommended 
that the natives be allowed to sell or exchange any portion 
beacomd off for them, subject to the consent of the official 
Department that will hold the land in trust for them under 
the Communal system. Of course such land to be valued on 
its surface value [i.e. to exclude the value of the minerals]. (32) 
The Concessions Commission, appointed by Milner, concluded its investigations 
in 1907. It recommended that one-third of each concession be removed and set aside for 
the occupation of the Swazi nation. While the ri&tts of some of the concessionaires 
were not recognized by the Commission, it was recommended that the other concessionaires 
who held recognized concessions should be given full ownership of the remaining portion 
of their land. In order to effect these recommendations the High Commissioner issued 
the Partition Proclamation of P907 and appointed a special commissioner, George Grey, 
to demarcate the Swaei areas by removing one-third f m  each concession, with the 
exception of mineral concessions. 
The Swazi, having had their petition rejected and after failing to achieve 
any success from a deputation that was sent to London from November 1907 to February 
1908 in order to protest against the recommendations of the Concessions Conmission, 
resorted to a passive opposition to the demarcation work of the Grey Commission. Grey 
himself, in a letter to the Earl of Selborne, who became Governor of the Transvaal 
after Nilner in 1905, complained that 
I could not do otherwise than consider the attitude of 
the Chief Regent, wlnich was tantamount to instructions 
from herself to the chiefs to withhold from me all 
information which mi&t be usefid to me, as opposition to 
the decision of Your Excellency. (33) 
Nevertheless, Grey was of the opinion that 
the interests of the Swazis have been almost as well known 
to me and as carefully consiaered as if they themselves 
had cordially co-operated in the work of the pmtition. (34) 
Grey went on to point out the principles he had used in making this demarcation: "The 
important factor in any calculations is that the amount of land estimated as being 
capable of supporting a native family in each area should be able to provide food for, 
and grazing for the stock of, a group of seven  native^.^' Using this as the basis for 
his calculations, Grey also made provision for population expansion. "1 have estimated 
the native areas I have selected to be capable of supporting,under existing conditions, 
a population of 159,278, or an increase of 52% percent of the estimated (present) 
populati~n.~' In addition, there were two ftmther factors which 
may be considered as constituting a considerable margin 
of possibility as to the ultimate capacity of the native 
areas selected to provide for the requirements of the 
Swazi Nation. First: that it is practically certain that 
most Concessionaires and. Farmers will try to keep a certain 
native population on their land, and that some proportion 
of the natives who find themselves outside of native areas 
will be contended [sic] with the terms that the landowners 
will offer them and will remain on the white man's 
land. Second ... that with deeper ploughing, more 
thorough cultivation and thinner sowing, the land 
is capable of producing twice the amount of food 
that the native raises on it by his present methods . . . (35) 
Regarding the proportion of the land that should be set aside for Swazi 
occupation, the Concessions Connnission and the Partition Proclamation had already 
decided on the principle of one-third of the land. However, with a cynicism becoming 
him, Selborne,. mindful of the llmagic of numbers", decided that some "window dressing1' 
was called for. In a letter to Grey he suggested: 
I think it would be as well, where you could easily do 
it, to add on to the native reserve a lump or two of 
land without increasing your expropriation list. I 
understand that the land thus added would not be of 
good quality or capable of supporting a large population, 
and that, therefore, the addition would be a show window 
addition; but I think that is a legitimate and not unwise 
thing to do under the circumstances. We [will then be] 
giving the natives more than a third of the good land of 
Swaziiland; it is legitimate, therefore, to add some 
poorer land to forestall the ignorant criticism that we 
are taking two-thirds of the land away from them. (36) 
In making his demarcation Grey worked on the assumption that the royal kraals 
and the herds of the most important chiefs should not be moved and that there should be 
minimal disruption to the lives of the Swazi. On completing his assignment, he 
reported that "while 37% of the total area of Swaailand has been selected as native 
area 5899 of the kraals are in the native area . . . all the important chiefs' kraals and 
the majoritg of the larger kraals in the country are in the native area .. .".(37) 
The concessionaires, however, were naturally given pride of place in Grey's 
calculations : 
I have given especial. consideration to the wishes of all 
Concessionaires occupying their land; I have visited 
every resident owner or held meetings in the nb;lghbourhood 
which all residents were invited to attend. In almost 
every instance, I believe, I have framed partition to suit 
the views of resident Concessionaires and have been able 
to avoid including their homesteads or amy land they 
cultivate in the native area. (38) 
Selborne noted the "check-boarding" native of the partition proposals but 
felt that, despite the opportunities that this would present the Swaais, who "are very 
prone to cattle thievingn (39), it was inevitable since one of the principles of the 
partition was that the kraals of the principal chiefs should not be moved. 
Nevertheless, he was extremely pleased with Grey's demarcation and wrote to the latter: 
"1 cannot pretend to be able to offer suggestions for the improvement of proposals that 
are so excellent." (40) 
The Swazii, needless to say, were less happy. At a meeting between the High 
Connnissioner, the Resident CoImnissioner, the Queen Regent and the Chiefs of Swaziiland 
on the 14th May 1909, one of the Chiefs, Frank Nkosi, noted sadly: 
With reference to the partition of the land. We cannot 
say much because we are like the woman that is married; 
we are married to this Government. Has the wife got 
power to prevent her husband doing what he likes because 
she is married to him? (41) 
Regardless of the state's attempt at window-dressing, however, the facts 
spoke for themselves. The Swazi were given 2,420 square miles out of a total area of 
6,553 square miles - about 37% of the country - divided into 32 scattered axeas. They 
were allowed to remain on concessionaire-owned land for a period of five years from 
the 1st July 1909, but after that period "they could only continue to occupy such land 
on terms to be agreed upon between themselves and the concessionaires, the agreements 
being subject to confirmation by the Resident commission erg^. (42) In 1913 Proclamation 
No. 24 was issued, providing machinery for the removal of Swazi from concessions after 
1 the five-year period had elapsed. A chapter had been completed in the history of the 
I Swazi, a chapter that was to have continuing repercussions up to and after independence. 
I Land Partition and Capital Accumulation 
There are a number of points that maJr be made in assessing the broader 
significance of the partition of land by the British state. To begin with (if there 
l are my who still need convincing), it is evident that the question of legal morality 
had absolutely nothing to do with the state's intervention. As Ekm&t-Moony, the 
I British Special Commissioner to Swaziland from 1902 to 1907 and Resident Colmissioner 
l 
I for part of 1907, himself pointed out, it was clear from a le@ point of view that 
Swazi had the right "to occupy and use the land [on which they were living, including 
the ceded land] ~s-t;rictedly~~. (43) This was totally ignored in the deliberations 
of the Concessions Commission and the Govermmentts subsequent measures. What, then, 
it is necessary .to ask, determined the statere intervention? The answer is that the 
1 state intervened in order to secure the conditions for capitalist accumulation. Such 
accumulation was obviously impossible under conditions where property rights were not 
only unclear but also in dispute. Accumulation could not take place in a situation 
where the Swazi rmlertj had the right and ability to charge high rents for *e use of 
the assets which they owned and to withdraw at will the use of these assets. 
I Furthemore, in securing the appropriate proper-& ri&ts for the accwnilators of 
l 
capital, it was necessary to remove the S w i  living on the land concerned. The 
"reservesff that were created to facilitate this process would serve to house the 
population that were not required as direct producers in the accumulation process. 
As has been shown, measures were then taken to enable farmers to obtain a work-force 
while the surplw population was removed to the reserves. The size of the reserves was 
determined by the conditions necessary under the prevailing social circumstances for the 
reproduction of the population. (44) This population, retaining access to the means of 
production, did not require assistance from state expenditures. In addition, the state 
took careful steps to maintain intact the political control of the Swazi rulers over 
their subjects by preserving their effective control over land, in this way securing 
control over =khe population 1.n the reserves. In retun, the King and chiefs were 
given genesow treatment when it came to determining the size of their own lands. 
l 
The capitalist (colonial) state, determined by the emerging process of 
accumulation, was itself therefore to create the conditions for M h e r  accumulation. 
As later Colonial Reports were to express it: 
l 
From 1914, when the 1a;ndowner acquired full ri&t to the 
land, agriculture on European holdings developed. Two 
large cotton plantations attracted British capital, and 
a non-profit-making company, fostered by the Government [45], 
took over a considerable tract of country for the purpose 
of establishing selected European settlers as agriculturalists. 
The tobacco gmwing industry was encouraged and considerable 
sums of British capital were invested in the resuscitation of 
mining. (46) 
Although the Proclamation of 1907 established the broad outlines of the 
state's policy regarding land and minerals (a matter that was once again to become a 
crucial issue during -the decolonisation period) (47), it did not go unchallenged. When 
Sobhuza I1 became King in 1921, he brnugnt a case against Allister Miller and the 
Swaziland Corporation as part of a strategy to regain land. However, in 1926, the Privy 
Council in Ehglauld ruled against Sobhma. Although during this period "the mind of the 
native was unsettled" (Miller), the capitalist state firmly upheld the existing 
property relations, and the period after 1927, with the benefit of greater certainty, 
saw a more rapid rate of accumulation. This was further encouraged by the visit of 
L. S. Amery in 1927, which was followed by the first large grant by the Dominions 
Office to Swaziland, amounting to L60,000. (48) 
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